Assad, after all, might not be able to hang on to power for long

The idea of safe zones, which Trump is parading, may emerge as a de facto arrangement, and in turn 'balkanise' the war-torn country

Recently, two US envoys met with both Lebanese and Turkish officials, separately. And it just so seems that a whole new war is unfolding in Syria. US President Donald Trump is now in possession of his cherished 'how do we hit Daesh's blueprint', crafted by his defence secretary James Mattis, who by many accounts is not at all a crazy canine, despite his nickname. 
The Turkish meeting was to gauge how far Turkey will help the US defeat Daesh as Ankara is seen as an important partner militarily along with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar and Israel.
The meeting with the Lebanese officials is less clear. On the face of it, the American military chief of the Middle East paid a call on the Lebanese president where they discussed military aid (a billion dollars since 2006). But many are wondering if Lebanon is going to play a decisive role in Trump's new Syria war. The local press a couple of days later mentioned Lebanese President Aoun wanting to build a buffer zone on Syrian side of the border but was not clear about what this would entail.
Trump has a lot of problems already in Syria. It's not just that he fails to understand the basics, which is worrying enough - like halting military aid to the FSA, which has resulted in some of them defecting to Al Qaeda while still being paid by Washington. It's not even that the dichotomy of interests between Turkey and the Kurds could blow up into a new conflict in itself with Ankara adamant that it will fight in Raqqa, where it is likely its troops will clash with US-backed fighters, half of whom are Kurds and see Turkey as a bigger threat than Daesh.
What's much more worrying than his ignorance is the shocking lack of shuttle diplomacy going on between the US and Russia in Syria. Because Russia is not being consulted, Moscow is getting jittery about Trump. The 'wait and see' pragmatism about his apparent desire to forge a new working relationship with Russia is now fading. Could it be that the US and Russia have entirely conflicting views on peace in Syria?
In recent weeks, Moscow has been suggesting a lot of sensible ideas about how to construct a political framework for future peace in Syria. These are, of course, being countered by the Americans who are trying to figure out 'how do we bomb this place back to the dark ages?'. Trump is keen. Really keen to get involved. Just look at what happened in Iraq the week before when James Mattis met with Prime Minister Abadi and within minutes, suddenly around 50 US advisers [that's 'soldiers' in fake-news-talk] were sent to fight on the front line along with Iraqi forces.
Moscow has been busy on the diplomatic front. Recently a leaked memo revealed that Putin wanted Assad to consider breaking up Syria into regions with their own assemblies rather like the post second world war idea to federalise Germany. Decentralising power though was not really what appealed to Assad but the call from Moscow signalled one important factor: Russia doesn't see the future of Syria with Assad as its ruler indefinitely. Something has to give.
The idea of safe zones, which Trump is parading, may well be a de facto arrangement which could 'balkanise' Syria, thus allowing the fighting to stop and reconstruction to start. Such an idea would be welcomed both by Russia and the US, if it gives Trump a PR victory.
The problem is how do you get to that stage without starting a whole new war among groups who use the war to settle old scores? There is a dire lack of trust here. President Erdogan is getting very nervous about Kurds in places like Manbij and Al Bab - the latter he claims his forces will take before moving onto Raqqa. Both of these plans though are at odds with both the US and even the Assad regime. The Turks don't trust the Americans and the Kurds, who are their proxy fighters as part of the SDF. The Americans don't trust the FSA, which is more or less under the control of Turkey. The 'opposition' fighters (mainly FSA) don't trust the US; the Kurds don't trust anybody. And nobody trusts Assad.
This wide scale lack of confidence can explain why we have seen some strange behaviour in the last few days. Erdogan has sent in special forces to Syria presumably because the Kurds in Manbij and Al Bab are too close for comfort as he is also nervous about a US-Russia deal which might create autonomous regions in northern Syria. The idea of giving two to the Kurds, without going the full nine yards and giving them a Kurdish state. And so the fall of Raqqa is crucial. Who takes it and who keeps it will play a major role in who gets the spoils of war leaving many to ask who, between Assad and Erdogan has more to bargain with, as they both barter with Russia and the US. The Syria war has never been about destroying Daesh and it will never be. As we have witnessed, it is more about geopolitics both with the regional superpowers and Russia and the US. If Erdogan can take Al Bab and then Raqqa, as he says he can, he will be the most important player in the carve-up, holding all the aces. For Assad, it's more about political survival, playing the game longer as his military strength relies heavily on allies. Putin may well trade Assad's political seat for a Syria that he can reinvest in, along with his American friends.
Martin Jay recently won the UN's prestigious Elizabeth Neuffer Memorial Prize (UNCA) in New York, for his journalism work in the Middle East. He is based in Beirut and can be followed at @MartinRJay.