Commentary: Dissecting US-China relations from Taiwan Strait to Hormuz

The author is president of UAE Safety and Emergency Security Association and professor of sustainable development at the American University of Sharjah. He is former UAE Minister of Climate Change and Environment and former Minister of Infrastructure. He authored two books on climate change that influenced academic and international reforms.

When Chinese President Xi Jinping invoked the term Thucydides Trap during his recent meeting with US President Donald Trump, it was clear Beijing was not merely referencing history but signalling the future.

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The concept —first articulated by the Greek historian Thucydides more than two millennia ago to explain the Peloponnesian War between rising Athens and dominant Sparta —has returned as a central analytical lens for understanding the evolving relationship between the United States and China. It also offers a powerful framework for interpreting the growing tension in two of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints: Taiwan Strait and Strait of Hormuz.

The Thucydides Trap rests on a simple but precarious relationship that when a rising power grows rapidly and the established power fears losing its position, the likelihood of conflict increases—even if neither side seeks war.

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The trap is not driven by intentions, but by mutual fear, miscalculation, and the tendency to interpret defensive moves as offensive threats. This makes the concept particularly relevant to the current US‑China moment, where competition has expanded from trade and technology into the maritime geography that underpins global stability.

China as Athens; US as Sparta 

China today sees itself as a modern Athens — a rising power expanding its economic, technological, and military influence, and viewing the Taiwan Strait as central to its national security. The US, in turn, sees itself as the modern Sparta — the established power that believes maintaining the status quo in Taiwan is essential to preserving the balance of power in Asia and preventing Beijing from reshaping the international order.

The Taiwan Strait has therefore become a direct theatre of the Thucydides dynamic — a rising power seeking to reclaim its strategic space, and a dominant power determined to prevent a shift in the global balance.

The numbers reveal the scale of what is at stake. More than 48 per cent of global container ships pass through the Taiwan Strait annually. An estimated $2.5 to 3 trillion in global trade flows through this narrow waterway each year. Nearly 70 per cent of Japan’s and South Korea’s high‑tech exports transit the strait, and it is a vital artery for the semiconductor supply chain that sustains the global economy. Any disruption in this corridor would immediately reverberate across global markets, energy prices, and supply chains.

Yet the Thucydides dynamic is not confined to East Asia. The world is witnessing another version of it in the Strait of Hormuz, where the interests of major powers intersect at a moment of regional and global uncertainty. Hormuz is not merely a passage for energy; it is a strategic crossroads where rising regional actors, shifting global power balances, and competing maritime doctrines converge. Around 21 per cent of global oil trade—roughly 17 to 18 million barrels per day—passes through Hormuz, along with about 25 per cent of global LNG shipments. These figures make Hormuz not just a Gulf chokepoint, but a global lifeline.

Securing maritime routes

China, which fears a maritime blockade in the Taiwan Strait, understands that its energy security runs through Hormuz. With imports exceeding 10 million barrels of oil per day, and with around 45 per cent of that supply coming from the Gulf, any instability in Hormuz would place immediate pressure on the Chinese economy.

The US, despite reducing its dependence on Gulf oil, remains deeply tied to the stability of global energy markets. Its ability to guarantee the security of maritime routes—especially in the Gulf—remains a core pillar of its global leadership. Thus, the two straits move in the same shadow — the shadow of shifting global power and the strategic competition between a rising power and an established one.

History offers many reminders that maritime chokepoints have always been the Achilles’ heel of great powers. Athens fell when it lost control of its sea lanes. Rome faced its gravest crises when its trade routes were threatened. The Spanish Empire declined when it could no longer secure the flow of silver and gold. The British Empire did not collapse in a single battle, but through its inability to protect the trade routes stretching from the Suez Canal to India. Today, US and China face a similar challenge: How to safeguard their interests in a world where geopolitical shifts are accelerating, power is diffusing, and maritime chokepoints are more sensitive than ever to miscalculation.

Can US and China avoid the trap?

The Chinese president’s reference to the Thucydides Trap was not a historical lecture. It was a strategic warning that the world is entering a transitional phase that requires historical awareness and political skill. The Taiwan Strait and the Strait of Hormuz are no longer mere geographic features; they have become mirrors reflecting the shape of the emerging international order. If the major powers fail to manage their rivalry, the trap could shift from a theoretical caution to a geopolitical reality capable of reshaping the world.

Trump’s recent visit to China came at a moment when both sides recognise that their rivalry cannot be left unmanaged. China seeks to signal that its rise is not inherently confrontational, and that the world is large enough for two major powers—if they manage their differences responsibly. The US, meanwhile, insists that competition must remain within clear boundaries that prevent unilateral changes to the status quo. Between these two positions lies the central question facing the world today: Can the two powers avoid the trap that ensnared Athens and Sparta, or will history repeat itself in a new form?

This question is even more urgent because today’s world is far more interconnected than that of ancient Greece. Global trade, supply chains, energy flows, technology, and maritime routes are intertwined in ways that make any miscalculation capable of triggering a global crisis. The Taiwan Strait could ignite a technological shock; the Strait of Hormuz could trigger an energy shock; and together they could push the international system toward instability.

The invocation of the Thucydides Trap in Beijing was therefore not a rhetorical flourish, but a framework for negotiation and a reminder that the world stands at the edge of a major transition.

History does not repeat itself exactly, but it casts long shadows—and the shadows of Athens and Sparta stretch today from the Taiwan Strait to the Strait of Hormuz.