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Why US should engage Syria
THE Baathist regime in Damascus, in one of those curious ironies of Arab politics, is strident in his rhetoric and ideology but invariably pragmatic and anchored to the cold logic of real politik in its international relations.
To paraphrase a Victorian statesman, the House of Asad has no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests.
When Syria needs to cut deals, protect its borders and ensure regime survival, its hardline Baathist ideology flies out of the window. Damascus invariably opts for the ancient Arab path of the haggle and the deal — the give-take of the diplomatic souk. The killings of Bashir Gemayel and Kemal Jumblatt, let alone 250 Marines and French Legionnaires in Beirut are atrocities from a bygone era. In fact, the survival of Hafiz Al Asad, his reign as the uncrowned king of Syria for a longer time than any predecessor going back to the Umayyad caliphs, was possible only because the Alawite air force pilot was an Olympian maestro in the three dimensional chess game of Levantine politics. He survived all his mortal enemies — Kissinger, Begin, Saddam, Reagan, the Gemayels and above all the Syrian brotherhood whose nemesis at Hama took place a generation before ‘the war on terror’ entered the lexicon of international politics.
Regime survival, not ideology, dictated Asad’s foreign policy from the moment he seized power in a 1970 coup. As Defence Minister in the Six Day war debacle, Asad could never let down his reputation as a pathological anti-Zionist, unlike his son’s professed willingness for ‘normal relations’ with Israel after a peace settlement. Hafiz Al Asad was no gambler in regional politics, but a cautious risk-taker whose foreign policy, while secretive was rational. In 1976, at the Arab League’s request, Syria intervened in Lebanon to the delight of the Christian warlords (who were busy massacring Palestinians in the siege and blood-letting of Tel Zataar) — and an implicit green light from both the US and Israel. Israel and Syria fought dog fights in the skies above the Bekaa Valley yet Asad never disturbed the status quo on the Golan Heights he had negotiated with Kissinger in the twilight of the Ramadan war.
In 1991, despite Baathist ideology’s mystical reverence for Arab nationalism, Asad joined the United States in Desert Storm. In 1989, as renegade, Iraq backed, Lebanese general Micheal Aoun threatened to seize power in Beirut, a Syrian assault team drove him into exile with implicit American approval. Sure, Hafiz Asad used the suicide bombers of Hezbollah and the gunmen of the Abu Nidal as proxies to do his work in Lebanon. But his objective was to force Israel, France and the US peacekeepers from his Lebanese sphere of influence. He succeeded all too well.
Syria even managed to preserve its image as the champion of Arab anti-imperialism on the Arab street even though Asad sided with Khoemini’s Iraq in the epic pan Arab struggle of the Shat Al Arab. The Arabist champion in Lebanon and Palestine became Persian Iran’s sole Arab ally in the first Gulf war.
Yet Hafiz Asad readily cultivated men he despised if Syrian strategic interests so dictated. He drove Yasser Arafat’s guerillas out of the Lebanese mountains yet never cut out the Palestinians with a Sadat style unilateral deal with Israel for the Golan Heights. Saddam’s Iraq was his sworn enemy and bitter Baathist rival since the 1960’s but when Iraq was debilitated by UN sanctions in 1997 and no conceivable military threat to Damascus, Asad cut a deal for a billion dollars of black market Iraqi oil that met Syrian energy needs and generated invaluable intelligence, UN sanction busting, smuggling options and foreign exchange. Iraq morphed from mortal foe to close friend.
Bashar benefits from his father’s geopolitical cunning from beyond the grave on Iraq policy. The Iraqi connection of the Syrian regime has also deterred an American attack as 431/435 lawmakers in Congress voted to impose sanctions on Damascus to punish it for alleged terrorism, WMD, Lebanese occupation, Iraqi subversion and even chemical weapons.
Just as the road to peace in Palestine and the Lebanese civil war passed through Damascus in his father’s time, Bashar mans the exit shock point of Bush’s Iraqi quagmire — the pivot, the source of all blessings, a key player and not just the pawn. Nothing illustrates the utter irrelevance of ideology more than the strategic alliance that exists between secular, status quo, Baathist, Arab Syria and theocratic, messianic, Persian, revolutionary Iran. Hafez slaughtered the mullahs in Hama, embraced them in the Hezbollahi slums of Beirut, in the Ayatollahs’ seminaries at Qom. In chess, the term checkmate is Persian for “Shah mot” (the king is dead). Hafez Asad’s enemies are all dead kings while his son rules Syria..
Bashar, a UK-trained ophthalmologist, a Syrian yuppie and techie baby boomer, is a chip off the old block. He is not traumatised by the Six Day War or his Alawite heritage. He is an international deal maker, possibly the best in the current Arab generation of captains and kings. When Turkey threatened war and the PKK became a threat to Syrian interests, Asad flew to Ankara and the Kurd revolt was history. Despite all the abuse and threats from the Pentagon neocons, Syria continues to deliver intelligence data on the Al Qaeda networks to the US. Even the State Department has confirmed that there is no Syrian involvement in international terrorism — and no Westerners are beheaded in the streets of Damascus.
Yes, Syria has scud ballistic missiles, a source of concern for neocon brigade in the US. But then, Israel has Jerichos with nuclear warheads. Turkey has cruise missiles. Egypt and Iran have missiles with far bigger payloads. It is too bad President Bush remains under the neocon spell in the White House and Pentagon. His entire Mideast agenda — a honourable coalition exit from Iraq, political reforms in the Arab world, war against terror, an Israel–Palestine deal, even Lebanese sovereignty and free market economies in the Levant — is hostage to the strategic calculations of Syria.
The US must therefore engage Bashar in the geopolitical souk he knows so well. Make deals, not war with Syria.
Matein Khalid is a Dubai-based investment banker
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