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Whose Hand on the Nuclear Button?

Pakistan’s history has been marked by triangular jockeying among Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Army Chiefs, as well as Constitutional gyrations facilitating Army, Parliamentary, and 
Presidential rule.

Against this backdrop, does this change in the Chairmanship of the NCA have meaning? Are changes in the NCA and public releases of information about them helpful or harmful to nuclear stabilisation on 
the subcontinent?

General Pervez Musharraf is taking well-deserved lumps for his long tenure as Pakistan’s Army Chief, Chief Executive, and then President. But one undeniably positive result of his tenure was a stable, institutional structure for Pakistan’s nuclear decision making. Musharraf stood up a dedicated military organisation, the Strategic Plans Division at Joint Staff Headquarters, to work on nuclear-related matters in 1999. A Nuclear Command Authority, chaired by Musharraf, was established in February 2000.

The composition and functions of the NCA were clarified when Musharraf unilaterally promulgated the NCA Ordinance in December 2007, after he dissolved the National Assembly. It is not possible to tell from the public record whether the NCA design, as promulgated in 2007, differed from its initial conception.

When Zardari replaced Musharraf as President of Pakistan in 2008, he nominally sat at the apex of this decision-making body.

Under the 2007 ordinance, other members of the NCA serving under the President were the Prime Minister of Pakistan (Vice Chairman); the Minister for Foreign Affairs; the Minster for Defence; the Minister for Finance; the Minister for Interior; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee; the Chief of Army Staff; the Chief of Naval Staff; and the Chief of Air Staff. The Director General of the Strategic Plans Division, Gen. Khalid Kidwai, has served as Secretary to the NCA since 
its inception.

The text of the newly amended ordinance has yet to be published, so it is unclear at present whether a new Vice Chairman of the NCA has been designated, and if so, who this person is. Nor has it been announced whether the composition of the NCA has been changed in some other manner.

The scope of the 2007 ordinance covered space as well as nuclear applications and technologies. The powers of the Chairman included establishing “committees and entities” as 
he deems fit.

Two Committees were previously announced: An Employment Control Committee, chaired by the President of Pakistan, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs as Deputy Chairman; and a Development Control Committee chaired by the President of Pakistan, with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, serving as Deputy Chairman.

The Employment Control Committee’s membership mirrored that of the 2007 NCA Membership, with the notable variation in the number two slot. The Development Control Committee had a decided military cast. Presumably, the Chairmanship of these two Committees has now shifted to the Prime Minister, but there has been, as yet, no official word on this, nor on whether the composition of these Committees has now changed.

The functions of the NCA, as spelled out in the 2007 ordinance, included the exercise of command and control over nuclear and space programs; supervision, management control, and audits of programs and budgets; authorising “specialised scientific and technological work”; authority to hire, fire, promote and transfer personnel; personnel reliability, safety and security programs; and the authority “to take measures regarding employees in respect to their movement, communication, privacy, assembly or association in the public interest or in the interest of integrity, security or defense of Pakistan or friendly relations with 
foreign states.” There is no public word, as yet, on whether the language of the new ordinance comports with the 
2007 version.

Far more is known about the new NCA structure and functioning in Pakistan than in India. On January 4, 2003 India’s Cabinet Committee on Security issued a spare press release on “operationalising India’s nuclear doctrine.” It conveyed the information that the Government of India had created a Political Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, which could authorise the employment of nuclear weapons. An Executive Council, chaired by the national security adviser, was also formed to provide inputs for the NCA and to execute the directives given to it by the Political Council.

The membership of both Councils has not been officially released. Presumably, at a minimum, the Cabinet Committee on Security sits on the 
Political Council.

India has a firmly entrenched Parliamentary system of government, whereas Pakistan’s governance has been subject to periodic, significant changes. Despite and because of these political upheavals, the Pakistan Army has remained, by far, the strongest voice on national security matters, as well as the arbiter between contesting 
political leaders.

Until these circumstances change, no matter which civilian sits at the apex of Pakistan’s NCA, the decision-making power rests in uniform.

Collective civil-military decisions remain ideal, but votes behind closed doors on crucial national security issues in Pakistan have always been 
heavily weighted.

No government, including the U.S. Government, says much about its National Command Authority. One important reason for doing so is to improve deterrence. Another is to promote reassurance for domestic and international audiences.

The Government of Pakistan might consider releasing more information to demonstrate institutional durability during a period of heightened 
political uncertainty.

The Government of India might consider releasing more information to disabuse those who might think that a decapitation attack in extreme circumstances has any chance of success.

Michael Krepon is co-founder of the 
Stimson Center, Washington DC