EAST ASIA’S reigning metropolis of billionaires, a city which served as a lodestone for entrepreneurs whose ambitions endowed it with a remarkable skyline a generation before Shanghai’s overtopped it, has become a source of much worry for Beijing’s mandarins.
The reason is to be found in the shorthand of ‘7.1’ by which is meant the 1st of July. On that day was organised one of the biggest protests in East Asia of the past decade. The great outpouring of Hongkongers — media sources in the city estimate some 500,000 came into the streets — in a demonstration against the government of the Chinese Communist Party is the most strident signal yet of the deepening political crisis in Hong Kong.
The provocation for the waves of protest that have shut Hong Kong down several times in recent weeks — ‘7.1’ was one of them, the biggest — is the reneging by the Party on what Hongkongers say is its promise, extracted after years of negotiation, to allow Hong Kong’s Chief Executive to be chosen through elections. Hong Kong’s citizens want an election. Beijing’s government, however, insists on a nomination committee (which a broad front of citizens’ groups and pro-democracy coalitions in Hong Kong say will enable it to screen out candidates).
What happens now? For an avowedly global city that turned the curious phrase ‘one country, two systems’ into a case for business as usual, the near future looks decidedly tense. Reportage from Hong Kong suggests that feelings are running very high, reminiscent of 2003 when 500,000 people marched in opposition to the Chinese government’s attempt to push through a tough anti-subversion law. That immediate, vocal, angry, non-violent and orderly display of self-determination by Hongkongers jolted the Party apparatchiks in Beijing, who thereafter took a more sophisticated line in the former British colony. They chose instead to use the mainland’s web of business interests and media to widen their circles of influence in the island, while slowly encouraging pro-Beijing parts of the city government to attempt what was called “patriotic education”.
The velvet glove appears to have been pulled off when the Party released on June 10, to the surprise of many in the city and in the mainland, a white paper on Hong Kong’s status. This white paper marks the limits of Hong Kong’s autonomy and grimly reminds the city that Beijing can declare a ‘state of emergency’ (which amounts to direct rule). The administration in Hong Kong — which must be seen by Beijing as following its line — has stepped up arrests of demonstrators and brought criminal charges against the organisers of the demonstration. At issue for the Party is how much can be tolerated in the name of economic expediency, for an even partly-successful season of protest could reverberate through China, and especially in regions in cities that have expressed their displeasure with central rule publicly. There may be only so much of ‘two systems’ that Beijing will tolerate.