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Lebanon on the brink

The situation was brought under control within a few hours and the border has been quiet since then. But this clash—the most serious in four years—underscores why Lebanon’s southern frontier with Israel is the most volatile border in the Middle East today, and how easily a confrontation could spiral out of control. Western policymakers must not shift their attention away from Lebanon, a small country that has long been the staging ground of proxy wars in the region.

The latest fighting did not involve Hezbollah, the Shiite political party and militia that has fought Israel for decades. But Hezbollah remains a central player in the dangerous drama that is unfolding along the Lebanese-Israeli border. When a pro-American coalition won Lebanon’s parliamentary elections last year, a seductive conventional wisdom emerged in the West: because Hezbollah and its allies were defeated at the polls, the group would lose some of its luster and a US-supported government would rule Lebanon. In fact, Hezbollah remains the country’s dominant military and political force. It holds the key to both domestic and external stability, and its actions will help determine whether there is another war with Israel, or if Lebanon will once again be wracked by internal conflict.

In November, the US-backed Sunni leader Saad Hariri was chosen as prime minister after he agreed to share power with Hezbollah and its allies. But Hariri’s government has no influence over the militia and its weapons buildup along the border. As long as the Lebanese Army remains weak, Hezbollah can argue that its fighters are needed to defend the country against Israel.

When Lebanon’s 15-year civil war ended in 1990, all of the country’s militias were disarmed. But Lebanese leaders allowed Hezbollah to keep its weapons as a “national resistance” against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, which continued until May 2000. After the Israelis withdrew, many Lebanese asked why the group did not disarm and become a strictly political movement. Hezbollah insisted that its mission of resistance was not over because Israel was still occupying a strip of land—called Shebaa Farms—at the intersection of Israel, Syria and Lebanon. (The United Nations later determined that the area is Syrian territory, not Lebanese.)

In July 2006, Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers in a cross-border raid, hoping to exchange them for Lebanese prisoners held by Israel. That set off a 34-day war which crippled Lebanon’s infrastructure, displaced one million people, and killed more than 1,200 Lebanese, the majority of them civilians. Since that conflict ended, both sides have been preparing for a new round. Hezbollah leaders boast that the group now has an even larger and more potent cache of missiles than it did four years ago. Israeli officials, who have also escalated their war rhetoric in recent months, estimate Hezbollah’s arsenal at between 40,000 and 80,000 rockets.

Hezbollah sets its own military strategy. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has threatened to hold the Lebanese government responsible for the militia’s actions. That puts Hariri in a difficult position and it makes him reliant on the Obama administration to keep Israel at bay.

Under the United Nations Security Council resolution that ended the 2006 war, UN peacekeepers are supposed to intercept illegal weapons shipments and raid storage sites south of the Litani River. They have rarely done so. While Hezbollah continues its arms buildup, Israel has also violated the UN resolution with frequent overflights into Lebanese airspace and by planting surveillance devices on Lebanese territory.

Neither Israel nor Hezbollah has an immediate interest in starting a war. Israel is more concerned right now about Iran (although if Israel attacks Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Shiite militia would likely be part of the Iranian retaliation). As part of Lebanon’s new government, Hezbollah cannot afford to instigate another war with Israel. But the danger of heightened rhetoric and a military buildup is that minor incidents along the border could spiral out of control.

By engaging Israeli troops earlier this month, the Lebanese Army was trying to assert government authority over the border. The army had not been in control of the southern border since the late 1960s, and it only deployed there after the 2006 war. But the army’s action is largely symbolic because Hezbollah effectively controls the frontier.

Still, the symbolism was not lost on Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, who quickly tried to portray the conflict with Israel as nationalist struggle in which his militia and the Lebanese Army are partners. “The army guards the resistance, and the resistance guards the army,” he said at a rally in southern Beirut. “The resistance will cut off any Israeli hand that tries to harm the Lebanese Army.”

The Obama administration can avert a new conflict by keeping its attention focused on Lebanon, continuing to support Hariri’s government, and helping to strengthen state institutions like the Lebanese Army. But US officials must eventually reach out to Hezbollah, which the State Department designates as a terrorist organisation. Washington could begin indirect outreach through France and other Western countries that maintain contact with Hezbollah. The administration must also press Israel not to overreact to future incidents along the Lebanese border, which could lead to war.

Without a strong central state that can defend itself, Hezbollah remains the most powerful force in Lebanon—and its weapons guarantee that dominance.

Mohamad Bazzi is an adjunct senior fellow for Middle East studies at the US Council on Foreign Relations