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Karzai’s Al Qaeda argument

The outgoing Afghan president, at the fag end of his two-term era, believes that the United States-launched war on terrorism was a miscalculation and unwarranted. Moreover, he told the BBC in an interview that there is no room for Al Qaeda and Afghanistan wouldn’t go the Iraq way. Surprisingly enough, this contention merits a debate.

The point is that Karzai’s elevation to the high office of presidency in the wake of Taleban’s ouster in 2001 by the US was under a firm consensus that the South-west Asian country has to be secured from Al Qaeda and the like. Moreover, his submission that terror sanctuaries beyond borders, an apparent reference to Pakistan, should have been attacked rather than the bastion of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan is a far-fetched theory, and indicates his lack of vision to take a holistic view of the then evolving geo-strategic equation. This aspect of mistrust had been the bone of contention between Islamabad and Kabul and has led to a failure in coordination in the fight against terrorism. No doubt, the tribal areas across the Durand Line on the side of Pakistan act as safe heaven for terrorists — even to this day, but the fact is that Afghanistan has always been the epicentre of terrorism. And it is these militants, who have become a nuisance for the entire region, ultimately ended up in places as far as Syria and Libya.

Last but not least, the Pakhtoon leader’s claim that he has always been in touch with the Taleban and exchanged letters and pleasantries in pursuit to broaden the peace canvas should be taken with a pinch of salt. It was his adamant attitude not to share power with the militia and keep Washington in an offensive to flush out the Taleban that brought the war-torn country to the brink. His allergy to the Pakhtoon militants, who hold sway over the entire southern belt and often knock at the doors of Kabul, was evident as he opposed international moves to recognise the Taleban as peace partners and bring them on board through a process of reconciliation. His holding back of assent to the Grand Jirga’s unanimously approved Bilateral Security Agreement with the US, which guarantees stationing of 10,000 troops after 2014, is a case in point. That rejection was meant to penalise Washington for harnessing Taleban as an alternative power icon. The undeniable truth is that Afghanistan, after two-terms of his presidency, remains chaotic. This illustrates his legacy for times to come.