Collusive deal won't democratise Pakistan

Although details aren't available at the time of writing, the understanding seems to have all the makings of a parochial and collusive agreement which promotes the narrow self-interest of two individuals, but does nothing to limit the role of the military in public life, or remove the power of the president to sack elected governments and even parliament.

Nothing now stands between Musharraf and the presidency barring Pakistan's supreme court, which is hearing petitions challenging his candidature. If it acts like it did on September 28 by dismissing similar petitions, it will let down many democratically-minded Pakistanis who came to place faith in it after it reinstated Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and affirmed the right of exiled former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to return home. Yet, its verdict can go either way.

The Court's earlier judgment upheld the Election Commission's flagrant manipulation of rules which forbid anyone who holds an office of profit from contesting elections for two years. This was manifestly bad in law.

Evidently, the All Parties' Democratic Movement (APDM), led by the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), put all its eggs in the court's basket. It should have understood that its judgment in the Chaudhry case was driven less by respect for constitutional democracy than a concern to defuse the lawyers' agitation for his reinstatement.

The Court failed to give effect to its own judgment on Sharif's right to return, avoiding a head-on confrontation with the army.

It may not be unfair to conclude that Pakistan's democratic institutions are too compromised by prolonged military interference to be relied upon to uphold constitutional principle. Its mainstream parties aren't yet strong or willing to complete the process of full democratisation.

This raises what might be called a "chicken-and-egg" problem. How can Pakistan make a much-needed transition to full civilian democracy while its political and jurdicial institutions are weak? And yet, how can its institutions facilitate that transition in the face of authoritarian pressures to compromise themselves —to survive? The moral-political pressure of a mass mobilisation for democracy alone can cut this Gordian knot. At any rate, another round in the fight for democracy has been lost. But this isn't the last round. A new one may have begun with the Benazir-Musharraf deal and the announcement that Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani will succeed Musharraf as army chief.

How the fight for democracy is now played out will be decided by four factors: the political parties' tactics, the higher judiciary's role, the masses' mood, and the US' calculations. Pakistan's higher judiciary, with its burnished image, can assert greater independence. But this, as of now, is an open question.

Pakistani public opinion seems to have decisively turned against the army. Recent surveys say Musharraf's approval ratings have dipped to just 34 per cent from 60 per cent in mid-2006. 58 per cent of respondents give his government "poor" or "very poor" marks; 56 per cent say they feel less safe than a year ago.

The US role could become overwhelmingly important. Washington favours the Pakistan army strongly over civilian leaders. The presence in Islamabad of senior State Department officials as Sharif was being deported showed their approval of Musharraf. Musharraf's more recent overtures to the US, and Kiyani's appointment, will strengthen this relationship. Newsweek says Kiyani is "smart, tough, talented-and pro-western", and the preferred choice of western military officials.

Like Musharraf, Bhutto has been wooing Washington with offers of allowing international agencies to interrogate AQ Khan and letting US troops conduct an attack within Pakistan targeting Osama bin Laden.

By entering into a shady, opportunist deal with Musharraf, Bhutto would violate the Charter of Democracy signed with Sharif in May: "We shall not join the military regime or any military-sponsored government. No party shall solicit the support of the military to come into power ..."

If the PPP were to cut such a dishonourable deal, as seems to be happening, it could split. Worse, that would help the army entrench itself in public life just as it's losing its credibility. This would weaken the pro-democracy momentum.

Regrettably, no external agencies or forces appear willing to restrain Musharraf. The three nations that matter the most to Pakistan-the US, China and India-seem resigned to supporting a dominant role for the Pakistan army. This tails the US view of Musharraf's indispensability, and is deeply cynical towards the Pakistani public's democratic aspirations.

India has a long-term stake in a democratic, stable Pakistan which can rein in the military. A democratised Pakistan is indispensable to South Asia's future as a peaceful, prosperous and harmonious region. Democratisation will help India and Pakistan demilitarise mutual relations permanently and contain communal and sectarian forces in both countries. The Benazir-Musharraf deal may have set back that prospect —at least for some time.

Praful Bidwai is a veteran Indian journalist and commentator. He can be reached at praful@bol.net.in