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BB’s make-or-break choice

Yet, Musharraf’s decision didn’t spring from some new-found respect for democracy. He blinked because there was pressure from the United States, exercised through threats and a 17-minute long 2 a.m. telephone call by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

Secondly, Musharraf probably didn’t want to risk further inflaming popular opinion against the army. Another eruption of public protest would have robbed his regime of whatever’s left of its legitimacy. A just-released Indian Express-CNN-IBN-CSDS-Dawn-News survey says 55.4 per cent of Pakistanis want him to quit as army chief before the presidential elections; only 29.6 per cent don’t.

Musharraf hasn’t reconciled himself to holding free and fair national assembly elections, which former Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif can contest. Last week, he again opposed their return from exile because it might not be “conducive” to elections.

Musharraf hasn’t abandoned the idea of contesting the presidential election in uniform, or as a bizarre alternative, nominating loyalists — Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz or Chaudhary Shujat Hussain — if the Supreme Court rules against his candidature. That would be a weird case of substitution and a travesty of democracy.

The more one learns about Musharraf’s secret deal with Benazir, into which he’s being goaded by Washington, the worse it sounds. Under it, she would return to Pakistan and contest elections provided she accepts Musharraf’s tenure as army chief till November 16. Benazir has confirmed this “confidential understanding”.

Benazir would like “confidence-building measures”, such as withdrawal of corruption cases against her and amending the constitution to enable her to become prime minister for a third time. Her spokesperson has said that the general’s uniform is not an “obstacle”. This means the Pakistan People’s Party might not oppose Musharraf’s re-election as president, but instead ally with him.

Benazir’s logic is that toppling Musharraf through a street agitation might lead to another spell of military rule or an extremist takeover of Pakistan. The logic is dubious. It makes a false opposition between extremes and rules out that Musharraf might be forced by the courts — now emboldened by Chaudhry’s reinstatement — not to seek re-election from the sitting assemblies whose terms expire shortly. It also underestimates the strength of public opinion.

It’s unclear whether Musharraf can persuade the army to impose another term of martial law. In recent months, the army’s standing has greatly eroded — because of its increasing intrusion into civilian authority, its exposure to the public, and handling of the Lal Masjid crisis.

Eight years ago, many Pakistanis accepted Musharraf’s coup out of disgust with the corrupt governance of civilian leaders.

But his regime betrayed its promises to cleanse governance, make the rich pay taxes, oppose extremism, and be transparent in implementing “free-market” policies. For instance, the Accountability Commission became a farce. Musharraf struck a deal with the pro-extremist MMA. There were scandals in public enterprises’ privatisation. Now, there’s widespread disillusionment with the military.

By entering into a shady deal with Musharraf which allows his re-election before fresh assembly elections, Benazir would violate the Charter of Democracy she signed with Sharif in May, which states: “We shall not join any military-sponsored government. No party shall solicit the support of the military to come into power”.

This will make it doubly difficult for Sharif to return home. Musharraf bears a special animus against him. Whatever Sharif’s faults — there are many — his continued exile will be a setback for democratisation.

It would be tragic if the PPP, Pakistan’s largest party, were to reach such a compromise, which might cause a split in it.

Worse, this would help the army entrench itself in a prominent political role just as it’s losing its relevance. This would undermine some major gains the pro-democratisation momentum has registered.

Regrettably, despite Musharraf’s ambivalent record vis-a-vis the Taleban, and his secret agencies’ questionable role in Afghanistan, external factors seemingly favour him. At least the three nations that matter the most to Pakistan — the US, China and India — do.

This is understandable in the case of the US which typically follows a myopic policy guided primarily by its global war on terror. It believes that Musharraf remains its best or sole GWoT ally. China is probably sceptical, if not suspicious, towards Pakistan’s democratisation.

However, India’s pro-Musharraf position is less understandable and much less justifiable. India has a long-term stake in a democratic, stable Pakistan which can rein in the military and its secret services, which nurture a strong anti-India prejudice — probably a more extreme obverse of the anti-Pakistan attitude of their Indian counterparts. That certainly conforms to the dominant view held within India’s security establishment.

Yet, India’s National Security Adviser M K Narayanan declared (July 29) that “the worst is over” for Musharraf; there’s been no “major dent” in his influence because he accepted the chief justice’s reinstatement “with grace”.

Besides echoing the dominant US view of Musharraf’s indispensability, this expresses cynicism towards the Pakistani public’s aspirations.

A survey of South Asia’s democratisation by India’s Centre for the Study of Developing Societies suggests that the democratic aspirations of ordinary Pakistanis are no weaker than those of Indians or Nepalis. One must wish them success in making Pakistan a full-fledged democracy, with a functioning party system which responds to their wishes on the basis of accountability, not benevolent military paternalism.

Praful Bidwai is a veteran Indian journalist and commentator. He can be reached at praful@bol.net.in