A Third Intifada?

I rushed through the answer, knowing fully that one cannot address such a multi-layered query in two minutes or less.

A ‘third uprising’ implies that the second uprising has already folded. But has it? Or did it simply lose momentum, sense of focus and direction, or were its energies squandered - as a popular uprising - on factional disputes and internal division? Surely some of the visible leaders in guiding the uprising, or Intifada, in its initial stages are no longer involved in the current stage. One cannot simply speak of one cohesive Intifada if many of the players have switched sides or changed roles, or are absent altogether.

To approach this subject more practically, the first Intifada, that of 1987, would too have to be scrutinised, and thoroughly so.

It’s obvious that Palestinian collective revolts are not a singular response to a singular problem, which is often an alien imposition: the British mandate, Zionist colonial designs, Israeli occupation, and so on. But what is often missed are the internal factors that too inspire the ire of the Palestinian masses: leadership failures and division, betrayal of the same ‘constants’ that they themselves have formulated, corruption, nepotism, etc.

The nature of the uprising of ‘87 was consistent with this model, although it certainly inspired a paradigm shift. On one hand, it was a collective cry for justice and an earnest attempt at ending the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land occupied in 1967. But it also represented the instinctive desire to reclaim the Palestinian struggle, which had for long been managed from abroad: Jordan, Lebanon, then, more or less, Tunisia. There was a permeating awareness among Palestinians in the occupied territories that their plight had turned into power struggles between various factions based in various Arab capitals, and their disputes were hardly ideological, but rather more pertinent to issues of control, money and status.

The first uprising quickly formulated its own ideas, mechanisms and symbols, all reflecting the unity of purpose among Palestinians. In fact the overt emphasis on ‘national unity’ in the Intifada’s symbols and slogans was a clear sign of Palestinian denunciation of disunity and factionalism.

Although the Israeli response to the first Intifada was lethal, it hardly compares to the more violent response to the second uprising of 2000. The Israeli government wanted to crush the revolt before it developed a rhythm and turned into a long-term popular commitment. Israel also operated with the erroneous assumption that the uprising was manufactured by late PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, aiming to extract political concessions.

The fact is both Israel and the Palestinian Authority - assembled following the Oslo Accords as an alternative to the all encompassing PLO - were caught by complete surprise as Palestinians took to the streets in another act of defiance and collective rejection of the Israeli occupation, but also of the wavering attitude and rampant corruption that pervaded their own leadership.

If we must accept that the second Intifada has concluded, or was forced to discontinue due to the internal strife and infighting between Fatah and Hamas, then an examination of its outcomes are of essence.

Although the second Intifada has not brought an end to the Israeli occupation, it certainly has made a serious impact on the political institutions in Palestine: giving rise to another leadership, that being Hamas, and forcing a major rethink within the once leading movement, Fatah. It has greatly undermined the PA, thus the Oslo accords that brought it into existence, therefore highlighting the need for alternative (and truly representative) political institutions, such as a revived version of the PLO.

Indeed, the conclusion of every major Palestinian revolt in the past has resulted in most unpredictable realities, and despite all attempts, the status quo that defined the pre-revolt periods are often negligible afterwards; new faces, names, priorities, slogans and symbols are often introduced to the mix, although defined by the ever-lasting desire for justice, meaningful peace and freedom.

The Israeli methods of subduing Palestinians and crushing their uprisings also produce new realities, thresholds and relationships: giant walls, new settlements, weapons of mass suppression, etc, which often complicates the already painful existence of Palestinians living under occupation, thus inspiring more revolts.

The first Intifada brought the struggle home and introduced local leaderships, who competed with the Old Guard at all fronts, including the right of articulating Palestinian demands and aspirations.

The second Intifada cancelled Oslo and its adjoining ‘culture of peace’ which was seen by many Palestinians as a worthless process that failed to amend the dreadful reality on the ground, although managed to empower a specific class of Palestinians financially as well as politically.

Now Palestinians find themselves in a transition that has an uncertain outcome. There are more questions than answers: where will the Fatah-Hamas clash lead? Will Fatah carry on while maintaining its current structure? For how long? Will Palestinians continue to adhere to the once uncontested demand for a two-state solution? How practicable is such a formula under the current circumstances where a clear-cut separation is most complicated, if not altogether unfeasible? How will the geo-political split between the West Bank and Gaza play out in coming years?

Palestinian uprisings are often a collective response to hard questions. The chances are the next Intifada - as surely there will always be one as long as the occupation continues - will articulate a popular retort to the ills that have afflicted the Palestinian cause, and will once again reassert the relevance, if not the leading role of the Palestinian people as the owners of their own narrative, and the guards of their own struggle.

Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) is an author and editor of PalestineChronicle.com