There are two effective methods to avert national threats – the political policies (such as the Anglo-American ‘Special Relations’ or American and Canadian political, cultural relations). The second is a military strategy. In the political world of realism, it is naive for any state to consider that the friendly political ties with another state can alone guarantee the security of a state. Today’s friends can be tomorrow’s enemy and vice versa. The security policy therefore by its very nature is based upon ‘caution and realism’ and not ‘sentimentality and hope’. Given this, it is rational to think that the significance of military force will always remain the most striking mode to secure the national sovereignty and security of a nation state. The possession of huge weaponry, armed forces, and counter forces is core to the very existence of any country. Since 1945, the emergence of nuclear weapons, on the one hand, has transformed the nature of warfare and on the other, it appears to be the dynamic driving force of national security, which the states desire to acquire in order to establish a nuclear parity against all big and small adversaries. Nuclear proliferation delivers a strong commitment to national security hence in the short span of fifty years the world has witnessed the gradual but transatlantic spread of nuclear weapons. Above any other factor, it is the serious reservation with respect to national security (in the anarchic interstate system) that plays the dominant role in persuading a state to become a nuclear power. States like Pakistan and Israel become more desperate to develop nuclear warheads when they have to encounter much stronger enemies in their respective geographical locations.

Conventional Pakistan
The conventional Pakistan is no match for India, and conventional Israel is relatively weak against its enemies like Syria, Iran, Egypt and Iraq in terms of conventional military capabilities. But by adopting the nuclear path, both states have offset their conventional military weaknesses, made their defences invulnerable and transform their inferiority to that of nuclear parity with their opponents. The conventional warfare failed to prevent Indian attacks on conventional Pakistan (1965 and 1971), however, the nuclear defence of pakistan seems to place a detterance against the aggressive designs of the traditional enemy. Today neither conventional Sri Lanka nor Nepal, but only nuclear Pakistan maintains the regional balance of power in South Asia. The interesting thing is that Pakistan has been (and still is) the strategic ally of the world’s strongest military power – US, yet she has apparently refused to rely on the latter to safeguard her security. But for the nuclear non-proliferation theorists (The opponents of nuclear proliferation) the nuclear dominated security relations among states have become dangerous. With the end of Cold War ‘discipline’ the post cold war anarchy encourages the ‘have nots’ or medium sized nuclear states like Pakistan, North Korea etc to blackmail the West and the US with their nuclear weapons. It renders the world more insecure. They further argue that the world with a large number of nuclear states tends to instable and destructive inter-states relations. The spread of nuclear proliferation amongst the states predict a violent, less cooperative and more conflicting future world. The very existence of nuclear weapons, if not an international but nevertheless still poses a serious external and regional threat to the peace. First of all, the regional peace is likely to be jeopardised if the new nuclear states, like Pakistan, by following the path of Soviet Union and US, indulge into relatively cheap but destructive nuclear armament race. Hence the chances of war are greater in the nuclear security paradigm. Secondly , the spread of nuclear weapons among under developed ‘middle states’ poses a great threat to the safety of the world through ‘accidental’ use of nuclear weapons. The new nuclear states like Pakistan and North Korea lack safety systems, ‘safe weapons design features’ of nuclear weapons and safe transportation to carry nuclear arsenals. This ‘accident prone’ feature of nuclear program in the ‘less technically capable’ (underdeveloped states) would lead the world to the verge of serious nuclear accidents. Lastly, the lesser or weaker nuclear states because of their insecurity against the strong enemies, are more irresponsible and immature in using the nuclear option. They can cause a nuclear holocaust in the face of a slight misunderstanding. Against this the nonproliferation theorists put their case for the removal of all nuclear weapons, installment of non-nuclear regimes and consolidation of conventional military paradigms.

Nuclear defences
Against this I argue that only through the gradual but steady spread of nuclear defences the world can secure infinite peace. When all the states are proliferated with the nuclear warheads, the national defences would become invulnerable and incontestable for any side. With the increase in the cost of nuclear war, the states would be least interested in military conflicts upon any of the big or small issues. The first argument of the critics of the nuclear order fails to see the logic of closeness and nuclear consequences of the nuclear strategic environment. The majority of the nuclear states exist side by side shares a common border and fall in the category of a “hostile pair”. Their closeness to each other would make them more cautious of the fact that the use of nuclear weapons would be horrifying for both sides. The best example in this regard is that of China and Soviet Union, China and India, Pakistan and India. In each of the case, the rival states live in pairs, side by side. The nuclear option would be devastating for both the sides and therefore the world has till now witnessed a nuclear peace between the above pairs. Secondly since the ‘nuclear balances are inherently stable’, the extra spending of some nuclear states on their military armaments does not initiate the armament race. Why? Because it neither threatens ‘nuclear balance’ nor frightens the other nuclear states. Once the state acquires necessary security through nuclear deterrence, she no more needs extravagant spending on the purchase of armament. The possession of nuclear weapons even at a small scale is a solid guarantee to the safety of a nation state. Thirdly, it is quite rational to believe that the new, middle or under developed states like Pakistan are quite capable to develop safety measures for their nuclear program. It is relatively easier for a smaller state to look after the little stock of nuclear warheads than the states with the huge number of nuclear warheads. And even if small states fail to prevent the nuclear accident, it would be limited to a small scale. The greater dangers arise from big powers. The small states don’t have the ‘stuff’ to affect the global peace.

Along peaceful lines
Lastly, the weak states of the system are more responsible in handling the nuclear programme along peaceful lines. First of all, they are neither the major nor regional powers that could provide the nuclear umbrella or support to other states and fight for their sake. Their objectives are less destructive and only limited to their security goals. And because they are weak and can lose quickly and greatly, it is easy to believe that ‘they will unleash a deterrent force even at the risk of receiving nuclear blow in return’. The lesser nuclear states would use their nuclear weapons only if and when it comes to their survival as in the Pakistan-India tension (2002), the international analysts were confident that Pakistan would certainly use the nuclear option. But the foreign secretary of Pakistan clarified that the country would use nuclear option only as a last resort. And it was the threat of this last option that restrained the far superior India from waging an expected war on its small adversary. One concludes that the nuclear weapons are significant in the sense that they bring conventionally weak states in a strategic position to maintain the balance of power along with big powers of the region. The states do not desire nuclear weapons to annihilate their enemies rather are desperate to become nuclear powers as it confirms their security against all small and big monsters. It sets off their conventional weaknesses, and generates confidence among them by transforming their defences
invulnerable. National security through nuclear weapons indicates a bright and stable future one which the world has already been witnessing since 1946.
(Kamran Shahid is the author of Gandhi and the Partition of India (2005) and International Relations and Political Theory (2006). He teaches I.R at the G.C. University Lahore)