After a grim year in Afghanistan that saw record casualties, falling public support in the US and Europe for the war and a tainted election that weakened Karzai’s authority, the conference was designed to inject momentum into the West’s floundering Afghan project.

Attended by over 65 countries, the conference sought as much to reassure western publics that there was a way out of the war as to show international solidarity for Afghanistan.

The main consensus reached in London was around a plan for the transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces within five years and a pay–for–peace re-integration initiative to lure low and mid-level Taleban out of the insurgency with jobs and other incentives to join the mainstream.

The dominant theme at the conference was reconciling with the Taleban. President Karzai announced plans for a process of reconciliation to include the Taleban leading to a peace Jirga. The final communiqué however referred only to re-integration. This raised the question whether the outreach to the Taleban marked a change in course by the US-led coalition towards pursuing a political solution or just served as an appendage to a military strategy.

The strategy fashioned at the London conference to “align civilian and military resources” exposed 
several contradictions:

·         Between Western countries’ need to tell their war weary public that they were seeking to wind down their military engagement and the conflicting message to the Taleban that US-NATO forces were not about to abandon the fight.

·         Between a military surge and the planned acceleration in the transfer of security responsibilities to 
Afghan forces.

·         Between British Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s five year timeline to complete this transition and President Karzai’s pronouncement that this could take 15 years.

·         And most significantly between the military surge and political reconciliation. This raised the question whether the plan to escalate the war instead of persuading the Taleban towards reconciliation would give them an incentive to continue fighting — at a time when the movement is at it’s strongest since 2001.

Why would the Taleban switch allegiance if they felt their side was winning and give up fighting if they were being bombed? The conference was unable to resolve these policy tensions. The muddled approach indicated uncertainty rather than a clear direction. It also reflected differences among coalition members as also within the US administration itself. The latter was vividly illustrated by leaked cables from Washington’s envoy in Kabul, Karl Ikenberry who questioned the wisdom of the surge and the inadequacy of Karzai as a strategic partner.

Significantly no consensus has yet emerged on the issue of pursuing a negotiated settlement to dissipate the eight year old conflict by reaching an accommodation with the Taleban. This means that beyond the goal to re-integrate Taleban foot soldiers the international effort does not yet have a shared vision of a dialogue with Taleban leaders. Washington’s thinking on this issue has certainly been changing. Like the view of several coalition partners, notably Karzai himself, many US officials believe that for the war to end, talks will ultimately have to take place with the insurgents. But the US has not reached the point where it is prepared to publicly acknowledge this or openly move in this direction.

This is evident from the statements of US officials that followed the London conference especially Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who repeatedly sought to distinguish between re-integration and reconciliation. She made it plain that the US “will be pursuing military action, going aggressively against the Taleban….but (supporting) an opportunity for those who choose to leave the fighting to re-enter society.”

The US has also continued to press Pakistan to undertake kill–or–capture actions against the Afghan Taleban in North Waziristan and those belonging to the so-called ‘Quetta Shura’.

Behind Washington’s public posture and its ramped up military effort is a policy debate that has been underway in the Administration and with close NATO allies about the timing and modalities of talking to the senior commanders of the Taleban. So far the view that has an upper hand in this debate is one that advocates a surge now-talk later approach. This argues that until coalition forces are able to bolster their position militarily and talk from a position of strength the Taleban will have no incentive to negotiate. Therefore, the surge and ‘reintegration’ plan should first reverse the momentum, split the foot soldiers from the leadership and weaken and divide the Taleban before transitioning to ‘reconciliation’.

Another view purportedly sees the present as the most propitious time to open negotiations. The Taleban have been confronted with the challenge of the surge but with fighting yet to intensify. It is precisely because the Taleban feel that they are strong that they can be tempted to engage in the political process. As far as Pakistan is concerned, it has already signalled that it can play a role in mediating with the Taleban once there is clarity about how and when to proceed. The view that has prevailed for now is to wait until Washington has made up its mind and decided on a political framework for talks with 
the Taleban.

The obvious question raised by this wait–and–see approach is how in the meantime Islamabad will deal with US expectations of cooperation with its military escalation strategy, which is at odds with its role as an interlocutor with the Taleban. While daunting challenges lie ahead in resolving the tensions in the US-led international effort in Afghanistan there is an important aspect of the evolving situation that has attracted little attention in the media. It’s India’s growing discomfiture over the emerging trend towards accommodation with the Taleban and the West’s quest for an orderly exit from Afghanistan. Delhi’s worry over reconciliation puts it at variance with the growing international consensus on the issue.

India could not have been pleased by the London Conference’s failure to make headway in establishing a so-called regional stability council to co-ordinate efforts in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s insistence that only ‘immediate neighbours’ should be included in such a framework as well as Iran’s non-participation meant that this part of the conference agenda fizzled out.

India could react to this by trying to muddy the waters in Afghanistan once it sees that the reconciliation process could gather pace. This will only add to the many obstacles that lie ahead in stabilising the worn-torn country. The most pressing challenge however is to square the many circles that have persisted beyond the London conference and map out a viable –and agreed – strategy that offers Afghanistan a real chance of peace.

Maleeha Lodhi served as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States and the United Kingdom. For comments, write to opinion@khaleejtimes.com