Overall, the US-funded program to train and equip the Afghan National Police (ANP) was well-conceived and well-executed, the joint report by the inspectors general of the State and Defence departments said.

“However, long-term US assistance and funding, at least beyond 2010, is required to institutionalize the police force and establish a self-sustaining program,” it said.

But, the report warned that the US and international effort was ”not limitless” and urged a stronger push for the ANP to transition to the authority of the Afghan interior ministry.

Obstacles to establishing a fully professional ANP were ”formidable” and include pervasive corruption, illiterate recruits, a history of low pay and an insecure environment, said the 101-page report, “Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness Program.”

An interagency assessment team looked at the state of the ANP between April 24 and June 22, when the team left Afghanistan.

The report, released by the State Department’s Inspector Howard Krongard, said it did not reflect subsequent events or developments in the war-torn country.

The ANP emerged as a still-enfeebled police force in this snapshot taken roughly four and a half years after the US-led offensive in November 2001 that drove the Taleban from Kabul and despite international aid efforts launched the following year.

“As it has rapidly evolved, police readiness requirements have expanded beyond training to include sweeping institutional reform of the ANP through the Ministry of Interior (MoI),” the report said.

“Nevertheless, ANP’s readiness level to carry out its internal security and conventional police responsibilities is far from adequate.”

The report cited “problematic” management of the police training contract and called for more effective coordination between State Department contract managers and the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A), which is responsible for executing ANP training programs.

Accountability for equipment turned over to the CFC-A was inadequate due to an ineffective ANP logistics system. The report recommened the establishment of an effective end-to-end internal controls process.

But the authors warned that until the Afghan criminal justice system has matured and was coordinated from the national to the local level, “the ANP will function more as a security force than as a law enforcement organization.”

Among the report’s principal recommendations was the expansion and better management of a mentoring program, “a key component to effect institutional change and build a capable, self-sustaining national police force.”

However, it noted, “the US and international effort for standing up the ANP is not limitless; therefore, transitioning full responsibility and authority to the MoI needs greater emphasis.”

Building an effective ANP program will require a long-term commitment from coalition and international partners, the report cautioned.

“Premature withdrawal from this commitment will compromise the progress already accomplished and put at risk the US goal to establish a professional police force embracing the values and practices of community policing and the rule of law.”