A call for an international conference would be an important step in dealing with a striking anomaly of contemporary international politics. America is widely condemned for its conduct of the Iraq war, while no country has been prepared to participate in a serious exploration of the political implications of foreseeable outcomes. Yet none will remain impervious. If America fails to achieve its immediate objectives — if terrorist camps or terrorist regimes emerge on the soil of Iraq, backed by its huge oil resources — no county with a significant Muslim population will be able to escape the consequences: not India, with the second largest Muslim population in the world; nor Indonesia, with the largest; not Turkey, already contending with incursions from the Kurdish portion of Iraq; nor Malaysia, Pakistan or any of the countries of Western Europe; nor Russia, with its Muslim south; nor, in the end, China.

If the Iraq war culminates in a nuclear Iran (as an indirect consequence) and an Islamic fundamentalism that can claim to have ejected Russia from Afghanistan and America from Iraq, a period of extreme turbulence verging on chaos is unavoidable, and it will not be confined to the Middle East. A threat to global oil supplies would have a shattering impact on the world economy, especially the economies of the industrialized countries. None of the potential victims of these trends has been required to contribute even ideas, much less been enlisted in the quest for a ‘political’ solution.

Instead, what is most frequently debated is whether diplomacy should be invoked at all. The administration, following one strain of American attitudes towards diplomacy, has implied that it is not yet ready to negotiate over Iraq — especially not with Iran and Syria, which are accused of fomenting the conflict and stirring up the violence.

The administration’s critics insist on an immediate resort to diplomacy without always defining what they mean by it. Many of them reflect the pervasive American nostalgia for an immaculate military strategy culminating in total victory, succeeded by an immaculate diplomacy operating by its own internal rules. The rejection of the Clausewitzian dictum of the relationship between power and diplomacy treats the process of diplomacy as distinct, governed by its autonomous logic. According to this view, diplomacy is fuelled by demonstrating goodwill and must be fostered by a constant readiness to break deadlocks with new proposals. Military operations should be reduced or stopped as the price for entering into the diplomatic phase. Escalation, however temporary, is proscribed. This attitude caused America, at the start of negotiations to end both the Korean and Vietnam wars, to accept a ceasefire in Korea and a bombing halt in Vietnam. Prolonged deadlock was the consequence.

From the beginning of the controversy in 2002 about whether to use force against Iraq and afterwards, I have supported the decision to overthrow Saddam, but I have also argued that no outcome in the middle of the Arab world could rest on imposition by military force alone. Diplomacy should always have been treated as an integral part of Iraq strategy.

The contemporary debate over ending the Iraq war has ascribed an almost mythic quality to the desirability of bilateral negotiations with Syria and Iran as the key to an Iraqi settlement. Willingness to negotiate will not be sufficient, however, unless the principles and objectives of both sides can be brought into the range of tolerable compromise. This will be a formidable task.

The diplomat must understand the minimum below which a settlement endangers national security and the maximum beyond which it is counterproductive to expect the other side to settle (in other words, the adversary’s minimum requirements). To go beyond these constraints risks a stalemate or impairment of America’s security.

Syria and Iran are weak countries that find themselves temporarily strong. The US remains a superpower even though it has manoeuvered itself into an extremely complicated and potentially disadvantageous position. But this has not altered the long-term power relationships. Wise leaders on all sides are needed to establish an international order that provides security to all participants and respect to all religions.

Only a few of the objectives of the US, Syria and Iran can be fulfilled via bilateral negotiations. Syria’s role in Iraq, for better or worse, is limited. Its prime objectives are to recover its dominant influence in Lebanon and the return of the Golan Heights from Israel. The United States, having only recently been the principal party in ejecting Syrian troops from Lebanon, is in no position to offer Syria a dominant position in Lebanon. Syria may well be uneasy about the growing impact of the Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon, but it likes American dominance even less; indeed, it uses arms deliveries to Hezbollah precisely to undermine American influence in Beirut. The United States does not possess enough incentives or threats to induce Syria to abandon its close relationship with Iran, which has been a principal element of Syrian policy for 20 years.

A return of the Golan Heights to Syria may be facilitated by a Syrian-American dialogue, since the parties were close to an agreement during the Clinton administration. But it would require an Israeli-Syrian negotiation, perhaps under American aegis, leading to a separate peace agreement between Israel and Syria.

Comparable limits exist with respect to bilateral negotiations with Iran about Iraq. The problem of Iran’s nuclear ambitions cannot be solved, except in the context of the multilateral framework that already exists or some alternative that involves the other nuclear powers. An agenda for a purely bilateral negotiation over Iraq excluding the Sunnis will appear in the Sunni world as a potential American-Iranian condominium or the beginning of American abandonment. It may thus trigger a rush to acquiesce in Iranian hegemony.

The utility of bilateral US-Iranian talks is primarily a re-establishment of a relationship, sundered for nearly three decades, to define principles for a return to normalcy. Iran’s leaders must be brought to understand that America, even in what appears as a period of domestic division, in the end will not allow hostile hegemony over a region so central to the well-being of the industrialised world. Taunting a superpower is dangerous, and constructive alternatives exist if Iran seeks national rather than jihadist or imperial objectives. The recent modification of Iran’s diplomatic tone cannot have been uninfluenced by demonstrations of America’s determination and power. At the same time, in the pursuit of its tactics, America needs to be sensitive to the complexes of weaker nations with colonial pasts.

The best impetus to a serious diplomacy over Iraq is by way of the international conference described earlier. Iraq’s neighbours are too much at odds with each other to be able to establish either the psychological or the security equilibrium for a regional conference by themselves. The political framework needs to be created by countries with a stake in the outcome. These would include the permanent members of the Security Council; Iraq’s neighbours; key Islamic countries like India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia; and major oil consumers like Germany and Japan.

These countries have many conflicting interests, but should have a common concern in preventing jihadist fanaticism from driving the world towards an ever-widening conflict. The international conference should be the occasion, as well, to go beyond the warring factions in Iraq to moving towards a stable energy supply. It would be the best framework for a transition from American military occupation. Paradoxically, it may also prove the best framework for bilateral discussions with Syria and Iran.

American military policy in Iraq must be related to such a diplomatic strategy. America does not have the luxury to determine its actions entirely by their relevance to domestic considerations. Unilateral withdrawal on fixed timetables, unrelated to local conditions, is incompatible with the diplomacy described here.

The willingness of other countries to participate in such an effort depends importantly on their assessment of the balance of power in the Middle East after the end of the war in Iraq. A successful diplomacy requires that American power remain relevant and available in support of a coherent regional policy.

After the Thirty Years’ War, the nations of Europe organised an international conference to set rules for ending the War, after the continent had been left prostrate and exhausted. The world now has a comparable opportunity today. Will it seize it while it still has a margin of decision, or must it wait until exhaustion and despair leave no alternative?

Henry A Kissinger, a former US secretary of state, is considered the architect of US foreign policy during the Cold War