Turkey, after all, has been a prime target of terrorism for the good part of the last four decades. But Turkey seems to be handling the threats aimed its way diplomatically, all while keeping the military option on the table, as the former U.S. president George W. Bush liked to say.
The government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) has confronted the threat from the PKK, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party with a combination of military power and political negotiations. A recent visit by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to Iraqi Kurdistan, the first of its kind, and Ankara’s intention on opening a consulate in Irbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq is a prime example of Turkey’s ability to apply the right amount of pressure and the right amount of power.
Turkey’s thawing of relations with Armenia is another prime example of Ankara’s successes in regional politics.
Yet one may begin to question whether the Turkish example of strict “laicite,” a word borrowed from the French in order to underline the strict separation of church and state as wished for by the founder of modern day Turkey, Mustapha Kemal Ataturk, is about to become a memory of a short-lived dream, if Turkey will chose instead to emulate its neighbour, Iran.
Despite its geopolitical significance, despite its geostrategic fixture as a bridge between the Muslim world and the Judeo-Christian West—including the long-standing pivotal role Turkey plays within NATO and beyond, including Turkish good offices when advancing the Middle East Peace process— there are mounting concerns stemming from both internal and external developments.
Domestically, the Justice and Development Party that has come into power since 2002, seems to gradually transform the country from a secular-European state along the directives outlined by Ataturk’s tradition, into a theologically based-nation modeled on Islamic teachings and practices. Internationally, fears have been expressed that Turkey can no longer be regarded as a reliable ally providing critical support for regional and global security needs.
In 2009, for example, several incidents resulted in increasing tensions between Turkey and its friends in NATO and elsewhere. In January Prime Minister Erdogan criticized Israeli president Shimon Peres during a televised debate at the World Economic Forum in Davos over the war in Gaza; a war which Turkey joined its Arab neighbours in calling “unjust.”
In October Turkey canceled scheduled war games with Israel’s air force; then Turkish state run television began broadcasting anti-Semitic programs; and finally, Ankara has strengthened its diplomatic and economic cooperation with Iran and Syria, two countries who stand accused by a large segment of the international community of sponsoring terrorism. It is not surprising therefore that these developments are worrisome to the United States, the European allies and Israel, particularly relating to Turkish foreign policy’s disposition on war and peace issues. Undoubtedly, the uncertainty of Ankara’s apparent changing diplomatic and strategic course further complicates prospects of it joining the European Union.
Already Germany’s new coalition government has voiced a strong opposition to Ankara’s EU accession, underscoring Berlin’s principal, “not membership, but privileged partnership.” Similar sentiments are echoed by France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy.
Still, Turkey’s support of counterterrorism efforts remains strong as Ankara seems very likely to continue to be victimised in the foreseeable future by politically motivated terrorism emanating from Kurdish separatists and from religious motivated terrorism from Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. And for the foreseeable future the PKK Kurdish separatists will continue to represent a serious challenge to Turkey’s internal security. Ankara’s response has been to strike the PKK and to pursue them in their safe havens well inside the Kurdish region in northern Iraq. At the same time Ankara is offering Turkey’s Kurds “expanding rights,” such as permitting Kurdish language television programs.
Turkey’s counterterrorism efforts are also of immense value to its allies outside the country. Particular mention needs to be made of Ankara’s role in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership with Turkey seeking to improve political, economic and cultural relations in the region. Additionally, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative aims to promote military to military cooperation in combating terrorism.
Yet between Ankara’s flirting with the Islamist East and wanting to become part of the democratic West, Turkey is a county doing a strange political waltz; one step forward and two steps back. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Erdogan and his Islamist-leaning AKP, the country has taken great strides forward, appearing more and more like Europe, a political entity Ankara badly wants to join. For the moment that is appearances; the reality may be different. The hope is that Turkey’s national interest will ultimately drive the country’s foreign policy in a more balanced direction.
Yonah Alexander is professor emeritus at the State University of New York and director for the International Center for Terrorism Studies in Washington, DC