The brutal attack claimed over a hundred lives in a city that has borne the brunt of the mounting region of terror. Taking the death toll from terrorist violence to a new peak, it makes October one of the deadliest months ever, with over 300 reported dead.

Both the resurgence of violence prior to the launch of a ground offensive in South Waziristan as well as the retaliatory bombings currently underway were widely anticipated. But the scale, spread and intensity of this wave of violence exceeded a similar sequence of attacks that preceded the Swat 
operation in April.

The aim in both cases has been to shake the official resolve, raise the costs of the military operation and erode public support. But the counter assaults have so far backfired. Rather than wear down the public will, they have steeled the resolve of the authorities to stay the course and have reinforced popular anger   against the Taleban.

Now in its third week, the South Waziristan operation, Rah-i-Nijaat,  is proceeding according to plan fashioned after months of careful deliberation and meticulous preparation.

It is the largest and most ambitious counter insurgency (COIN) campaign in the country’s history, involving 60,000 troops, of which 45,000 are deployed in a combat role and 15,000 
in a support one.

Its aim is to strike at the strategic centre of gravity of the militant threat to the country, seize control of the area from the Tehrik-i-Taleban Pakistan (TTP) and deny it space in what has long been its stronghold. It also marks the first systematic assault to sever the ‘facilitation’ connection that has emerged   between the Pakistani Taleban, Al-Qaeda and assorted splinters of other militant organisations.   Over the years, South Waziristan has provided the base, hub, sanctuary and training ground for militant actors of varying ideologies, origins and goals to ally tactically and coordinate their attacks against the Pakistani state. It has been used as a staging post for militants to pursue their war into Pakistan’s cities and foment instability. Eighty per cent of all suicide bombings in the country are tracked to this tribal region.

It is precisely because the operation’s core objective is to eliminate these bases and dismantle this infrastructure of terror that the various tentacles of the militants have sprung into retaliatory action. This has produced mayhem but it also exposed sleeper cells and networks in different cities that have revealed valuable new information 
to the authorities.

Baitullah Mehsud’s death by a missile strike in August threw the TTP into disarray. The internecine fighting that erupted during the succession crisis weakened the organisation and opened a window of opportunity for the authorities to leverage. This vulnerability has been exploited by a combination of military pressure including a prolonged campaign of air strikes and political maneuvers to isolate and contain Baitullah’s fighters, where they have been progressively squeezed by rival Waziri groups in the south and north.

Having evidently learnt the lessons from previous unsuccessful forays into South Waziristan, the security forces moved in to the Mehsud heartland gradually through a three-pronged advance— south from Razmak, northeast from the Shakai Valley and Wana and northwest from Jandala towards Kotkai. Although they met strong resistance, the Pakistan army units were able to advance relatively expeditiously, securing high ground positions in order to dominate the valleys.

Early gains have included the fall of Kotkai (hometown of the new TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud), capture of militant hideouts, dismantling of 25 training camps and seizure of large caches of arms and ammunition. This doesn’t mean that   the risks and dangers that lie ahead are not formidable. Notwithstanding the proclaimed goal to conclude it within eight weeks it will likely be a longer, more difficult haul. The synergy expected to be attained by the ground offensive and the use of air power may quicken the pace somewhat. But the imperative to complete the ‘clear’ phase of the operation before winter sets in imposes its own 
set of challenges.

The vast and arid mountainous terrain is among the several obstacles that have to be surmounted. Militants, instead of engaging the security forces, will more likely disperse and bide their time to launch a classic hit-and-run guerilla campaign once army units are in the ‘hold’ phase. Military planners have acted to address this vulnerability by destroying militant bases, choking their supply lines and keeping Taleban fighters on the run. Nevertheless it remains to be seen what tactics the militants will use to respond to this pressure. The greatest source of uncertainty that can affect the overall outcome of the operation relates to the sustainability of the gains in the critical ‘hold phase’ and beyond. What will be the civilian/political component of ‘hold’ and ‘sustain’ in the post-conflict phase, something not spelled out.

If the lack of government preparedness to deal with the refugees fleeing the fighting in South Waziristan is any guide, this does not auger well for civilian management of the post-operation phase. Until this question is convincingly addressed it is hard to see how an environment that is inhospitable for militants and terrorists can be created. Sustainability will rest on the effectiveness and legitimacy of the administrative and political arrangements put in place in the stabilisation phase.

This raises the all-important question of local support for the operation as well as for the central authorities in the post-operation phase. Can the Mehsud tribes be de-coupled and weaned away from the militants that have long entrenched themselves among them? Dropping leaflets addressed to the local tribes as reassurance that the operation is not directed against the Mehsuds and only targets the militants is part of the official effort to ensure that the operation doesn’t trigger a wider tribal uprising.  Avoiding collateral damage in civilian casualties will have a crucial bearing on efforts to secure the support of the Mehsud tribes. So can mismanagement of the humanitarian dimensions of the operation, in particular the relief and rehabilitation of the displaced population from the area.

On these questions may hinge the ultimate success of the operation. The operation’s outcome may well determine the fate not just of the TTP but of other militants who have used the Mehsud stronghold to build a deadly capacity to challenge the Pakistani state and strike at will against its symbols and manifestations. The stakes could not be higher. The campaign will not by itself eliminate the militant threat. But it could deliver a decisive blow to the militants’ ability to control the area and use it to challenge the writ of the 
Pakistani state.

Maleeha Lodhi served as Pakistan’s 
ambassador to the United States and the United Kingdom