Roughly, it went something like this: Iran’s nuclear technology reaches critical mass and Israel decides to strike. On Day One of the Four-Day War Israel scrambles its air force and destroys most of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear infrastructure. Israel weights the threats of a possible Pakistani raid, but Indian intelligence, usually excellent when it comes to anything to do with Pakistan, reports that Pakistan lacks long-range delivery mechanisms. On Day Two, massive protests erupt from Casablanca to Karachi. On Day Three, following Friday prayers, the crowds, hyped-up by fiery sermons from radical imams storm government building and carry out a coup in Pakistan. Within hours, the Islamists are in full control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

On Day Four the Pakistani Taleban (with support from Al Qaeda) load two nuclear weapons aboard Lear Jets and fly them to South Africa, and from there to Israel, where the pilots plan to crash their planes with its deadly cargoes on populated centres. I finish the article by saying that this was all a bad dream, or rather one Writer’s dark vision of what could happen if the conflicts in the region are allowed to remain unchecked. The most frightening concept of the above imaginary scenario is that today, it is even closer to reality than 
ever before.

Pakistan is on the brink of a disaster with the Taleban paying back the Pakistanis for their support of the American offensive in 2001. Attacks by the Pakistani Taleban against the government in Islamabad are becoming more frequent and more daring. In October, one group managed to capture a key military building near the army headquarters in Rawalpindi, even if the authorities retook it a few minutes later. The question is what happens next time when the Taleban take the ministry and manages to keep it?

What happens when radical fanatics like the Taleban become the rightful owners of a nuclear arsenal? Today, that scenario is no longer that far-fetched. For the last several weeks President Barack Obama has been agonising on what to do about Afghanistan. His generals are calling for more troops in order to be able to adequately fight the war, which incidentally is beginning to look more and more like Vietnam conflict. In other words, this war is unwinnable.

US military planners want to repeat the ‘surge’ that President George W. Bush ordered in Iraq, and which some analysts claim turned the tide of the war in the US’s favour. But the politicians in Washington are not convinced that more troops is the answer. Others are starting to say that the United States would be better off if it were to withdraw together from the war in Afghanistan. Some are suggesting to simply declare victory and leave.

Why would a premature withdrawal from Afghanistan constitute a mistake? Well, because the stakes have rarely been higher. An early US withdrawal from Afghanistan would be handing the country to the Taleban on a silver platter. Part of the consequences of such a move would reinforce the Taleban across the border in Pakistan, bringing that country, a crucial ally of the United States in the region, under Taleban rule. Consequences of that becoming a reality will place the whole Indian subcontinent on the brink of disaster as India will not sit back and watch its long-time nemesis fall in the hands of radicals who will have a nuclear arsenal at their disposal. India got a taste of what that might look like with the attacks on Bombay hotels and train stations.

Now the latest strategy proposed by Washington is to buy off the Taleban with US dollars, in much the same manner that the Sons of Iraq where bought-off and shifted their loyalty from Osama to Uncle Sam. It’s been working well in Iraq so far. Yet, the question everyone has been asking is what happens when the Americans leave and stop paying Iraqis. Some are betting that the former Iraqi insurgents will once again join the anti-government forces. Chances are that in Afghanistan the same could happen. It does not suffice to bribe tribal leaders and their followers. US dollar will buy temporary loyalty, however it will not buy that same loyalty in the long run. What needs to happen is a long-term investment in the people. What needs to happen is to develop an education program that would integrate these former insurgents into normal life. But before that that can happen there needs to be an infrastructure in place that would allow the problem to be adequately addressed along with people to train the former insurgents.

As it now stands both are lacking. The current US strategy in Afghanistan appears to be the equivalent of applying a Band-Aid when major surgery
 is needed.

Claude Salhani is Editor of the Middle East Times and the author of the just released book, “While the Arab World Slept: the impact of the Bush years on the Middle East.”